
Reasserting legislative primacy through the provinces: Peter Copeland in Without Diminishment
As judges turn social policy into an endless contest of rights, Canada’s elected politicians are surrendering their responsibility to govern.
This article originally appeared in Without Diminishment.
By Peter Copeland, November 18, 2026
Canada’s legislatures are sitting on the sidelines instead of fulfilling their essential role in tackling today’s toughest social issues. As they abandon the field, the courts have been only too glad to usurp their authority.
Rights loom large in this domain. Questions about the relationship between rights and the public good are fundamentally questions of policy, subject to moral and political reasoning. Yet these choices are increasingly presented as technical legal problems best left to courts. Governments have learned to fear anything their legal departments label a ‘Charter risk’. Ministers shudder at the prospect of falling foul of what is supposedly the clear and unambiguous rule of law and so dilute their proposals or simply decline to act.
The result is a vicious circle. Courts become more accustomed to making policy because legislatures leave important questions unanswered. Legislatures become still more reluctant to address these matters because courts have shown themselves all too willing to intervene and shut down policies on politically charged issues. It’s time to break that cycle. Governments should stop treating the Charter as a set of instructions issued by judges and begin treating it as one part of the Canadian Constitution that they themselves are responsible for interpreting and implementing.
In the face of judicial activism and the usurpation of the legislatures’ policy-making prerogative, it has become tempting to seek more favourable judicial outcomes through litigation. Legislation, however, is the more promising path. Legal interventions, while important, can entrench the faulty modes of judicial reasoning and the underlying anthropology that treats rights as expansive claims inherently in conflict with one another and with the general welfare—a framework that leaves courts to weigh the countless resulting infringements. Instead, we must recognise that rights are inherently limited, defined in relation to concrete goods such as the benefits of stable family life, public safety and truth-seeking, and are meant to foster the common good. This approach requires expression in well-crafted legislation. Elected lawmakers are best equipped to undertake this work.
Courts have an essential role in enforcing constitutional limits and ensuring the consistent application of law. But they only decide particular disputes. Legislatures construct the institutional order through which rights are realised. They hear from a broader range of interests and have a democratic mandate to weigh difficult trade-offs when allocating scarce resources and assigning duties across institutions. A court may declare a right or impose an obligation, but only a legislature can specify who owes what to whom and co-ordinate the laws, institutions and resources needed to give it practical effect.
Provincial legislatures across the country are waking up to the problem. Saskatchewan and Alberta have demonstrated through their use of the notwithstanding clause that legislatures need not remain passive. British Columbia’s incoming government has an opportunity to act forthrightly on addiction, public disorder, parental authority in education and sex-specific spaces. Conditions have become sufficiently dire to create political capital for substantive change. B.C.’s new government should seize the opportunity and provide a model for other provinces to do the same in their own backyards.

Rights require specification
For too long, governments have allowed their justice departments to operate as the in-house branch of what Ted Morton and Rainer Knopff famously called the Court Party.
Any new policy proposal is put through an assessment of what the courts might do with it. Ministers are warned of ‘Charter risk’—a label especially likely to be placed upon conservative proposals that depart from the prevailing social zeitgeist.
Governments that take assessments of Charter risk too seriously often view them as both a clear and unambiguous articulation of a Charter right and a clear forecast of how judges are likely to interpret such rights under existing jurisprudence. They should be read only as the latter.
Charter rights are stated at a very high level of generality: ‘Life, liberty and security of the person’, ‘equality before and under the law’, protection against ‘cruel and unusual treatment or punishment’. By themselves, these do not tell us much about how prisons should be organised, when children can make consequential decisions, or how governments should respond to addiction.
In fact, it’s entirely unclear what these rights should entail in practice or how they fit with other rights or public goods such as safety, family authority, property and general social order. Their meaning must be specified.
Too often, politicians and the public assume that providing such specificity is the exclusive purview of courts—which have been all too eager to do so. But courts bring a contested perspective to this task. Their modern liberal rights discourse gets the relationship between law and rights backwards, treating rights as little more than vague and open-ended claims to some desired good, owed by society at large.
Such claims rest on the idea that autonomy and maximal choice are good in themselves, and that human equality should be interpreted as requiring affirmation of all these choices, even to the point of insisting that both choices and their outcomes be treated equally. Because this framework leaves unclear what is owed, by whom and for what purpose, rights claims easily expand without limit, inevitably colliding with other expansive rights and public goods, leaving courts to decide which of a potentially endless list of ‘infringements’ are justifiable.
A more coherent account understands rights as relationships between a right-holder, one or more duty-bearers and the particular acts or restraints owed.
Crucially, rights are never realised by just two actors. They ordinarily require a wider web of legislators, administrators, courts, police, professionals and service providers, each bearing different responsibilities and thereby giving the law practical effect. It is legislatures that give the law practical effect by specifying who owes what to whom and in what circumstances, assigning these supporting duties and constructing the institutions through which the right or public good can be realised.
A prisoner has rights, but imprisonment changes the legitimate specification of many of them. The rights of a child differ from those of an adult. Doctors, parents, employers, teachers and public officials possess different rights—and different responsibilities—by virtue of their stations.
In this framework, rights are inherently limited, defined in connection with the goods they are meant to secure. Rather than standing in tension with the general welfare, they help realise it when properly tailored. People are remarkably dependent on others, with limited entitlements alongside duties and obligations. Law is meant to specify those relationships and bring them into an intelligible order.
However, the dominant approach under the Charter presumes a state of nature in which we are free-floating, unattached beings with vast rights to do as we please. Every restraint on autonomous choice is treated as a prima facie ‘infringement’ and submitted to judges for balancing.
An autonomy-worshipping culture
In this autonomy-worshipping culture, it’s not hard to see why courts are willing to declare rights for men who self-identify as women or enshrine drug abuse and homeless encampments as constitutionally protected.
We see the same process across a range of social issues. The goods that policy choices seek to secure are instead framed as limitations on individual rights, so the policies themselves require judicial sanction to proceed.
In the Drug User Liberation Front case, a B.C. court found a federal prohibition on possession for the purpose of trafficking unconstitutional, accepting that it obstructed access to a less dangerous drug supply. In so doing, the court got the proper object of rights exactly backwards. Rights are not prima facie entitlements to damaging behaviour. Drug abuse damages the person; it is not a good that rights exist to secure. It’s a great irony that the section 7 right to life, liberty and security of the person engaged by the case was used to justify continued access to substances that undermine those very things.
The more recent Waterloo encampment ruling in Ontario makes a related move. By treating homelessness as a ‘constructively immutable’ characteristic protected under equality rights, the court elevated a remediable social condition into a constitutional classification. Although the remedy stopped short of an unconditional right to housing, it required lawful sheltering arrangements and constrained removal of the encampment.
In disputes over pronouns, sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI), the same anthropology threatens to invert the relationship between children and parents. Saskatchewan’s parental-consent policy was challenged under children’s security and equality rights and suspended by an injunction. In this framing, parental involvement becomes a potential injury to the child’s autonomous identity rather than an ordinary expression of responsibility for a dependent person. Children appear under this logic as free-floating individuals whose choices adults must affirm, rather than as dependent people whose development and full panoply of rights arise through relationships of care, education and developing judgement.
Litigation is less promising
Litigation aimed at persuading judges to balance incompatible and ever-expansive rights differently may seem an attractive response. But it ends up further entrenching the courts’ power and flawed judicial philosophy. Pending and recent cases illustrate this.
For example, Canadian Women’s Sex-Based Rights (CAWSBAR) claims women face unique threats from males in their prisons. The federal government contends this does not create a materially or statistically greater risk of violence than the already high baseline risk in correctional settings. The government may be right that, after individualised risk assessments exclude some men from female wards while admitting others, the additional risk of harm is only marginal, as suggested by the frequency of violent incidents in prisons. But there is obviously more potential harm than the threat of violence alone, particularly psychological harm arising from close proximity to men who are sexually predatory. The separation of men and women in prisons, sport, shelters and other settings has never depended solely on proving that each individual man or woman poses a statistically significant risk. Privacy, dignity and the particular circumstances of women who have suffered male violence are themselves relevant considerations.
Social science may tell us how often assaults occur, but it cannot determine whether bodily privacy is itself a good. A normative judgement is required, and it is too often made by courts rather than legislatures.
Underlying these disputes is a worldview in which any policy thought to interfere with substantive equality or self-determination is treated as unconstitutional. It rests on a highly contested account of human nature and the common good that is nowhere to be found in the Charter’s text.
Judges treat rights as mathematical problems
Modern rights litigation increasingly presents such questions as though they can be resolved by judges hearing competing expert witnesses and deciding whether one side has produced enough evidence of ‘harm’ to outweigh another group’s rights claim. It treats the balancing of rights like a mathematical problem for which judges simply need to develop a proof.
This is the conceit behind the Oakes test and the proportionality tests courts now employ throughout the Western world. When judges resolve disputes this way, they are simply concealing their inherently philosophical and moral reasoning beneath a veneer of technical legal logic.
Through the Charter, they have smuggled in this worldview of maximal autonomy and substantive equality, especially for groups deemed vulnerable. They enact it using the institutional trust of the courts, just as progressives abuse ‘science’ to support eugenics, abortion and transgender ideology.
When self-determination is the starting point and laws are treated as presumptively suspect infringements requiring justification, normative standards of health, sexual difference, familial authority, public order and responsibility appear chiefly as limitations that government must justify.
Ideally, our laws would better reflect a coherent understanding of human nature and what constitutes harm and the scope of rights. Our legal history and tradition did so, but their insights are increasingly neglected. Alas, we don’t have the Roman Curia’s philosophy of judicial interpretation, which anchors doctrinal developments in the body of law associated with the Church’s magisterium, rooted in original source texts and right reason. We have a liberal and progressive society that grounds law in a navel-gazing conception of liberty as licence.
A conception of liberty that cannot distinguish freedom from licence provides a foundation of quicksand. Legislatures should challenge that by articulating the goods rights exist to secure and giving them institutional form.
Reasserting legislative primacy
Legislatures must be more forthright in articulating the parameters of rights. There is no right for men to enter women’s prisons, for anyone to use drugs or encamp wherever they choose, or for children to overrule their parents on the grounds of some dubious identification or claim of psychological harm.
Equally, legislatures should do the important work of ensuring that prisons meet inmates’ safety needs, that recovery-oriented care and treatment are available, and that alternatives to homeless encampments are provided. There is no ‘right’ requiring them to do these things, but it is their proper responsibility. They are also responsible for avoiding incoherent laws such as DRIPA and for not blaming the courts for doing their best to sort through the resulting legislative mess. In this case, the fault lies with legislatures, albeit progressive ones.
As failed social policies imposed by the courts attract greater public attention, provinces like B.C. should use this newfound political capital to legislate in these areas—particularly drug use and treatment, homeless encampments, gender identity in schools and across sex-based spaces. Lawmakers should clearly articulate the good the legislation is meant to secure. B.C.’s new government should be forthright in requiring compulsory treatment for drug addicts in cases that warrant it and in building the treatment capacity to ensure it can be carried out. Provinces should be unapologetic in removing people from public spaces on the grounds of personal and public safety. B.C. should take its cue from Alberta and Saskatchewan when it comes to SOGI in schools and parental rights over pronouns, as its incoming government has already promised to do.
Provincial legislatures across the country should legislate boldly, defend the legitimate distinctions their laws make and accept responsibility for the institutions those laws create. When courts reject legislatures’ good-faith efforts to provide treatment for drug users, or resources and alternative accommodation for homeless people, those legislatures should invoke the notwithstanding clause, which exists for the very purpose of constructively disagreeing with the courts’ interpretation of the meaning and scope of a right. Rights on paper depend upon institutions and personnel. In Canada, it’s up to provincial governments to deliver much of this practical capacity.
Legislatures must return to the field and be afforded the deference necessary to fulfil their vital role.
Peter Copeland is director of Domestic Policy (Acting) at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.
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